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Abstract 
The authors argue that the various middle classes of Europe, especially Western Europe, are being 
fragilised  as  a  result  of  globalization,  certain  political  tendencies  and  especially  by  the 
standardization of space and place following the implementation of a policy of Europeanisation. In 
particular, we concentrate on the ECoC (European Capitals of Culture) programme (launched in 1983, 
over 40 Cities have held the title since), as this embodies these changes and pressures. We argue 
that the middle classes are caught in a crisis of confidence in traditional institutional arrangements 
as local definitions of time and space traditionally grounded in individuals and neighborhoods are 
reworked and reoriented to favour national and especially European identities. The new difficulty of 
attaching a sense of self to public places and to local time has weakened the social Self and created 
resentment towards larger political institutions responsible for denaturing local time and place. 
 
Keywords 
Europe, cities, ECoC (European Capital of Culture), middle class 
Preamble: the Americanisation of the European middle class
4 
Even if the salient traits of the middle class first arose in the interstices of late Medieval 
politics (cf. Furet 1995), these were later overshadowed by the features that emerged 
full-blown after World War II – spatial and social fluidity, a willingness to experiment with 
'traditional'  social  arrangements,  a  rejection  of  older  (19
th  century)  status  markers,  a 
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wary attitude towards tradition, a belief that individuality is affirmed by transformations 
of the Self, and embracing (and even creating) 'popular' culture in the 1950s and '60s as a 
celebration of middle class status that thumbs its nose at 'tradition'. Nonetheless, many 
of these traits were seen as secondary. It is as if the attention directed towards middle 
class  culture  never  went  beyond  reacting  to  Thorstein  Veblen's  turn  of  the  century 
formulation (1953 [1899]), that the middle class is merely an 'in-between' category whose 
members  are  continually  seeking  to  emulate  'higher'  bourgeois  status  to  which  they 
aspire and distance themselves from the 'lower' working class from whence they came. 
Unable to accept that its many cultural permutations and manifestations could be the 
basis of its vociferous claims to recognition, analyses from the 1950s onwards of the 
middle  class  were  often  dominated  by  critiques  of  declining  'values'  (though  no  one 
seemed to be able to define these) or of middle class complacency and crassness (cf. 
McCracken 2003).  
Whatever its alleged position in a 'traditional' status structure, post-World War I 
American middle class social mobility and alleged freedom were admired by urban middle 
class  Europeans,  especially  in  Germany,  Italy  and  France  (Ben-Ghiat  2001),  who  saw 
American  popular  culture  (as  they  interpreted  it)  as  a  legitimate  means  of  escaping 
'tradition'. European women in particular were eager to adopt some signs of 'American' 
middle  class  emancipation  (De  Grazia  1992),  especially  in  an  urban  context  that  had 
already begun to furnish them with new opportunities – jobs outside the home, cinemas 
and strolling in parks (as venues for 'going out' with men – an evocative turn of phrase in 
several  Western  European  languages  –  and  escaping  courtship  traditions  largely 
controlled  by  their  parents),  and  the  somewhat  anonymous  quality  of    large  cities 
compared to small towns and villages, which, in many parts of Western Europe, formed 
the pool that fed urban migration. In the 1920s and 1930s, many Europeans still had kin in 
the countryside, which underlined even more the contrast with the city's size, emerging 
fluidity in social relations and a relative anonymity that favoured the public expression of 
markers of individuality.  
In brief, some elements of the Western European middle classes that would later 
dominate the urban landscape after World War II were 'Americanizing' themselves by the 
1930s in order to contest bourgeois hegemony
5, which had not hesitated to make full use 
of 'traditional' traits (resurrected, exaggerated or simply invented), such as patriarcality 
and the notion of a homogeneous folk as the basis of the political community. It is not 
                                                             
5 'Hegemony' is a sensitive word and a greatly-discussed condition. We use it here in its Gramscian sense of 
the domination of subaltern classes by bourgeois values and norms (Carnoy 1984), which is clearly the case 
for most of Western Europe between 1860 and World War II. 'Domination', however, does not mean that 
there is no social and political resistance or negotiation. For example, the paradoxical position of the urban 
middle class during this period of being locked in a struggle between mobility and stasis, does not 
contradict the view of bourgeois hegemony, since most interpretations of the history of mores suggest 
that most middle class urbanites seem to have implicitly accepted 'tradition' (bourgeois values) as one of 
the natural terms that defined one pole of the opposition that dominated their lives. 'Hegemony', 
therefore, is similar to Foucauldian 'normalisation' but more clearly stresses that 'values' implicitly refer to 
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important whether this 'American' reaction in Europe was really transmitted through 
American films (which, in part, it was) or from letters from emigrants describing their 
new situation abroad (in fact, a not inconsiderable source of information in Italy, though 
perhaps less important in other countries) or was merely a local desire for mobility that 
had been projected onto an iconic America in an attempt to enrich the moral capital of a 
middle  class  increasingly  loathe  to  answer  calls  for  sacrifice  in  the  name  of  the 
Fatherland.  By  the  1920s,  however,  many  Western  European  governments  had 
successfully fused centralised authority with 19
th century forms of bourgeois hegemony 
by manipulating selected cultural traits to create an individually-embodied semiotic link 
that disempowered the 'citizen', itself a resurrected and redefined category with its own 
semiotics of subordination expressed as 'duty' towards the State
6.  
The result for many middle class Western European urbanites was a continual tug 
of war between state-sponsored 'tradition' and a desire for greater social mobility fuelled 
by any available moral and political capital; in the 1920s and '30s, this capital was 
identified as 'American'
7, though it was not exclusively of American origin nor 'American' 
in its implementation; the European middle classes have never been as open to the idea 
of cultural experimentation and cultural mobility as their American counterparts. They 
seem to have been driven to augment their social capital to define new spaces from 
which negotiations with hegemonic power could proceed   while not sacrificing petty 
bourgeois 'respectability' gained by outwardly conforming to 'tradition'. 
This struggle was perhaps the most important factor in explaining the historical 
ambiguity and weakness of the European middle classes  after World War I: eager to 
embrace American-style 'individualism' (as they saw it) when it helped them step up the 
social ladder, yet paradoxically willing to preserve their status by appealing to an older 
(and 'traditional') caste-like system of values – the 'right' address, the 'right' schools (at 
least for the children of people making a jump up the social ladder), 'polite' manners, 
'refined' tastes in music, literature and art (cf. Elias 1983). Between 'American'-inspired 
individualism  and  a  struggle  to  acquire  bourgeois  and  aristocratic  traits,  it  is  not 
surprising that its traits are hard to define.  
Admittedly, this polarity between 'tradition' and 'innovation', between the national 
and the local, between the countryside and the city, between resistance and complicity, 
is not so simple as we have sketched it here, since European identities are a complex mix 
of ethnicity, religious orientation, gender roles and social class. Furthermore, there is no 
                                                             
6 The crystallisation of individual resistance and government-fuelled hegemony around questions of 'taste', 
'good manners' and 'hygiene' (to cite only three of its components) has been around for a long time, as 
Kelso notes (1929). For example, it is not the Minister of Health but the Minister of Education who in 1878 
declared to the Italian Parliament: 
… when the body is healthy and strong not only does physical courage re-emerge in people  
… but also moral courage, as well as the temperament, character and honesty of people's 
behaviour, and the abhorrence of oblique choices.  
… We still do not place sufficient importance on physical education, which gives the body its grace, 
strength and agility. (Jacomuzzi 1973, cited in Socrate 1999:429; my translation). 
7 Later, this popular search for new cultural capital would be denounced as the menacing 'American 
Challenge' (Servan-Schreiber 1968). Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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uniformity  in  the  way  middle  classes  are  constituted  in  different  countries,  as  Kocka 
points out (1995) in his salient overview of the problem of definition and boundaries. 
Middle classes in Eastern Europe in particular faced their own particular dynamics of 
exclusion and discrimination compared to people in similar professions in the West. As 
Melegh suggests (2006), it was clear to the (relatively small) middle classes of the East 
that established governments favoured maintaining a status quo in which aristocrats and 
large landowners (usually the same) dominated the countryside and the power structure. 
The urban middle classes were therefore forced to seek inspiration for their penchant for 
modernisation and modernity (in which they could carve out a well-defined niche for 
themselves) in foreign models situated in the West. They were thus more cosmopolitan 
and open to innovation compared to their Western European counterparts, though in 
some cases especially in the Balkans, it is certainly possible that an alleged cosmopolitan 
attitude was also sign of a colonial past (cf. Waldek 1942 for a classic description of 
“cosmopolitan” decadence in wartime Bucharest). 
Without engaging in long and perhaps sterile debates about defining the middle 
class,  it  seems  clear,  as  Kocka  points  out  (Ibid.),  that  middle  classes  share  a 
consciousness of distance from various aristocracies and nobles, and that they are also 
conscious that their social power and status is in part not inherited but due to their own 
efforts. Yet to those that insist on the undeniable diversity of the European landscape, 
we would reply that even if Europeans do not live in a completely polarised world, it is a 
fact that only European class politics gave rise to the extremes of Fascism. Other identity 
vehicles there may be, but this empirical complexity does not mean that today there is no 
sensation of being pulled in different directions by the underlying political forces that 
favour individualism and adherence to a well-defined community, especially since the 
ideological polarities of 1920s and '30s that indelibly marked so many European lives are 
the  direct  ancestors  of  the  sentiments  that  led  to  the  foundation  of  the  European 
Community. In other words, the fact that people enrich their social identities with any 
capital available is perhaps a sign of the underlying rigidity of the status system.  
This long preamble is necessary to establish the inherent ambiguity of the European 
urban middle class so that we can present our point: its cultural flip-flopping has led the 
contemporary European urban middle class to a structural impasse from which it may be 
impossible  to  recover  the  traits  that  until  recently  defined  its  compromise  between 
individual  innovation  and  class  conformity,  between  'traditional'  individualism  and 
'traditional' political conservativism. In this paper, we seek to use its ambiguous qualities 
as  a  point  of  entry  to  understand  the  dynamics  of  fear  that  have  recently  come  to 
dominate some European urban middle class discourses and practices, especially their 
rejection of older nationalisms (associated with their subordinate position) and of newer 
attempts to define an European Union (EU)-sponsored 'pan-European' identity, coupled 
to a propensity to adopt a newer, 'cosmopolitan' identity. This third option, however, has 
its own contradictions, as we will argue, that further weaken middle class political power 
and social capital within the increasingly complex framework of power that has become 
hidden and impenetrable – shared power between national governments and the EU, 
and  the  rise  of  the  new  mobile  transnational  economy  centred  on  information  and   Lanoue, Mirza, Pantaleon / The collapse of the European … 
 
 
139 
image,  though  this  too  has  made  educational  and,  eventually,  career  choices  more 
difficult.  
We  attempt  to  expose  the  way  in  which  people  react  to  the  dynamics  of  de-
classification  and  re-classification  as  the  urban  middle  class  is  threatened  by  recent 
changes  in  governance.  Although  there  are  global  dynamics  involved,  we  argue  that 
regional  cultural  dynamics  play  an  important  role,  especially  in  the  recent  shift  from 
'popular' culture to cosmopolitanism among many sectors of the European middle class. 
In particular, recent shifts in EU political policies that favour a re-classification of older 
urban neighbourhoods have created doubt and confusion among the middle class as the 
changes to the signification of local public spaces has forced people to rethink identities 
in very individual terms, leading, as we have suggested, to a rejection of Europeanism 
and nationalism (and all this implies for 'invented traditions' co-opted by governments; 
cf. Hobsbawm 1983) in favour of cosmopolitanism. Inevitably, these changes involve how 
people identify 'tradition' and its groundings to place. In the midst of recent and very 
vociferous  debates  about  identity,  this  essay  concentrates  on  subtle  but  important 
manifestations  of  shifts  in  the  social  contract  between  governed  and  governing, 
especially in the definitions of public places, that, we argue, have long term negative 
effects  on  'middle  class'  as  an  established  category  in  State-level  power  relations  as 
people are forced to rethink their relation to 'traditional' meanings of place.  
Placing 'time-ful' tradition 
Time,  the  past  and  history  are  not  disembodied  concepts.  When  people  and 
governments argue about the salient points of history that they will use to negotiate the 
present, they often do so in terms of place and especially in terms of the length of time a 
person or a group has allegedly spent in one place. The passage of time is a sense of 
spatially locally meaningful causality (cf. Gell 1992) that animates social memory. Time is a 
powerful metaphor of identity and a metonym of place.  
Many scholars argue that State control of linear time is the heart of modernist 
governance (cf. Hüppauf and Umbach 2005:3-4), clearing the way for the imposition of 
national  histories  and  for  ideological  and  standardised  readings  of  individual 
subjectivities and contingencies. This has been the subject of vigorous debates on the 
emergence and new roles of 'alternative', non-official histories tied to subjective and 
highly-politicised  interpretations  of  place  and  its  occupation.  Are  such  alternative 
readings of grounded subjectivity emerging after the weakening of official histories (a 
tempting conclusion to scholars of the post-communist world, which after all includes 
Germany; see the pertinent example by McFalls, 1997, describing battles to establish 
which  conflicted  memories  will  define  a  reunited  Germany's  history),  or  are  these 
alternative readings an intrinsic feature of the 'normal' construction of social life that 
have  not  been  reported  by  anthropologists  generally  unconcerned  with  the  middle 
classes, especially now that anthropological attention has focussed more attention on 
the  margins  of  the  world  system?  Even  scholars  who  favour  the  latter  position  (cf. 
Walkowitz and Knauer 2004) do not explore the link between place and intersubjectivity. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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The authors in Christiansen and Hedetoft (2004) also ignore the 'solid' middle class and 
take for granted that people use only political and collective capital (such as alternate, 
discriminated or 'buried' ethnic identities) to position themselves in the fast-changing 
postmodern political landscape.  Other studies on identity – too many to list here – also 
assume 'ethnicity' (insofar as it incorporates a degree of 'natural' attachment to place) 
can be used to oppose 'artificial' national identity. These, however, often look only at the 
political margins, where this opposition leads to disputes about the signification of place: 
Corsica, rural Italy, Northern Ireland, Wales, etc. (e.g., Macdonald 1993). Even pertinent 
studies  of  mainstream  countries  (Rapport  2002)  such  as  Britain  often  concentrate 
(though not exclusively) on smaller towns and on marginal groups. Relatively few studies 
concentrate on how people use place to rethink 'tradition', at least those people who 
have invested the most in establishing 'tradition', the middle classes.  
Public  spaces  (all  sites  to  which  people  have  free  access)  are  managed  by 
governments to project a normalised political culture onto their citizens. They aim 1) to 
impose on individuals a physiological sense of the grandeur of the state;
8 2) to project 
the image of a 'national' architecture in order to legitimate an ideologically -attuned 
aesthetic field whose symbolism links the individual to 'national' history; 3) to control the 
displacement of citizens so they develop a physiological sense of social time that flows 
according to a linear politico -ideological model (for example, the zoning of post -1850 
cities  that  condemns  people  to  shuttling  between  home,  work,  shopping  and  
entertainment);  and,  finally,  4)  to  underline  the  dominant  role  of  State -sponsored 
rationality (which legitimates State 'management') by imposing a 'rationally -planned' 
spatial grid on civic space (Hüppauf and Umbach 2005), which nonetheless remains 
'open' and 'free' so that people become self -governing and accept the hegemonic 
dynamics that favour the reproduction of elite power.  
The unstated aim of contemporary 'urban planning' is 'rational' zoning, segregating 
people according to class and, more recent ly, by ethnicity. Perhaps this what Rabinow 
meant when he baldly stated (2003:353) that, "modern urban planning emerged under 
the aegis of French colonialism between 1900 and 1930" despite that the first overall plan 
for Paris was put forward in 1769 (Garr ioch 2002:211)
9. Urban planning, in other words, 
responds  to  the  implicit  rationality  behind  the  political  regime;  the  modernist 
manifestation  simply  stressed  ethnicity  so  individual  attempts  to  identify  with  a 
community would 'naturally' focus loyalties on the alleged incarnation of the community, 
the State.  
Hüppauf and Umbach argue (2005:6) that the use of architectural idioms to create 
an aesthetic field of functionalism supports and reproduces State managerial governance 
                                                             
8 For example, Sixtus V's (1585-1590) arrangement of Roman obelisks in an arc to define the city's sacred 
space (Tobia 1996:176); not to mention more recent examples such as the Arc de Triomphe, Trafalgar 
Square, etc. Even more recently, the Centre Pompidou, the new Louvre and the Millennium Wheel are huge 
structures whose allegedly irreverent interpretation of architectural tradition nonetheless communicates a 
sense of communal grandeur. 
9 Partial but nonetheless grandiose plans had existed for Paris from the end of the 16
th century (Yarwood 
1974:329). The same is true of London after the Great Fire of 1666, and I have already mentioned Rome.   Lanoue, Mirza, Pantaleon / The collapse of the European … 
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by, "… portraying modernity as transparent and rational, disguising its cultural specificity 
behind a façade of universalism". To control space, therefore, is also to control time, 
because  legitimating  the  rationality  behind  universal  governance  rests  as  much  on 
establishing the narrative (and 'rational' structure of history; cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 
1992) as it does on the physical control of place. 
There is another, more intimate, aspect to governance, time and place, however. 
Public  urban  spaces  help  establish  multiple  power  bases  that  become  the  basis  of 
individual resistance to modern, 'rational' managerial governance. As Czaplicka states, 
"… the identification of a group with place can be wielded as a powerful instrument for 
political mobilization, for it allows for a concrete and territorial articulation of the social 
and cultural distinctions that lie at the core of political groupings" (2003:373). In other 
words, the same sites managed by governments are used by people who appropriate a 
'public' space and transform it into a place of intimacy, 'their' place, to oppose these 
State  mechanisms  of  spatial  politicisation  of  the  Self.  These  places  are  not  'private', 
'secret' or offbeat. People can reinterpret government-installed monuments by inventing 
mythologies that contradict 'official' significations, using 'official' elements for their own 
purposes of publicly emphasising complicity or resistance, just as Herzfeld has described 
(1991, 1997) in his studies of Greece, or the many popular legends attached to Roman 
monuments (D'Arrigo n.d.)
10. People, therefore, not only attach memories to public sites 
but also construct parallel, non-official histories of local sites that become iconic points of 
reference in establishing individuality as a legitimate political category: like the State, 
people too attempt to 'control' space.  
The longstanding cleavage (since the 13
th century, in parts of north-western Europe 
and  in  north-central  Italy)  between  central  governments  politically  dependent  on  an 
agrarian feudal base and relatively autonomous cities controlled by bourgeois oligarchies 
has given rise to the category of the seemingly 'free' urbanite, who is of course not so 
much  free  as  playing  out  a  ritual  whose  complex  semiotics  blur  the  line  between 
resistance  and  complicity.  In  other  words,  European  cities  have  long  been  sites  of  a 
ritualised struggle to control place and memory, and, therefore, to control the behaviour 
and attitudes of urban residents who, for an equally long time, armed with the label of 
'free' urban citizen, resisted being transformed into pawns of state centralisation. This 
institutionalised antagonism has today become much more complicated and ambiguous 
due to the effects of globalisation and EU cultural policies. It is no longer automatically 
"embedded"  (Hannerz  1999:328)  in  daily  life  or  "naturalised"  in  political  culture  (cf. 
Yanagisako and Delaney 1995).  
                                                             
10 For nearly every monument there are popular stories and legends that place the popolo – the 'little 
people' – at the heart of the attempt at government-sponsored monumentalism. For example, Rome has 
six 'talking' statues that were used during the time of the Papal States (till 1870) to display political 
pamphlets denouncing the papacy. These written documents were described in terms of orality ("the 
statues talk"), an act of political appropriation by the illiterate popolo. Street names have also received the 
same treatment, with many Romans believing that they are the manifestation of 'popular' or 'folk' 
etymologies. For example, the Street of the Armenians, over time, has been reinterpreted today as the 
Street of the Armorers, an elite craft guild belonging to the people; see Delli 1975. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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Our methodology here is admittedly very loose, since we are concentrating on a 
sense of malaise that does not necessarily manifest itself as political action (for example, 
a change in voting patterns
11) or even as a social trend (for example, more rave parties); 
indeed, it may be the opposite, as a sense of apathy and distrust. It is hard to measure 
sentiments and emotions but there are signs everywhere of growing polaris ation and 
frustration. Certainly, traditional measures such as rising unemployment rates, migration 
and emigration rates, and crime rates are helpful in targeting the problem, but this essay 
is more a call for further research than a global survey of the situation in Europe.  
Eu policies, place and memory 
Since  the  control  of  a  defined  territory  over  time  establishes  the  legitimacy  of  State 
power, individuals react to perceived inequalities in power by claiming that individual 
memories  attached  to  local  places  are  the  also  legitimate  means  of  establishing  the 
autonomous Self. Invariably, this engages them in semiotic battles with the State for 
control of these public spaces. As Simon Schama argues in his analysis of memory and 
place, landscapes are not an objective backdrop to which human activities must adapt: 
"Landscapes are culture before they are nature; constructs of the imagination projected 
onto  wood  and  water  and  rock"  (1995:61).  Schama,  however,  is  describing  tropes 
(forests, rivers, mountains) that are rural and bucolic, long-established and collective. We 
examine meanings and signs that are urban and banal, fluid and intimate, but whose role 
as signs of the past are nonetheless used by people to construct an individual identity in a 
larger political framework.  
Admittedly, individual identity is as difficult to target as it is to define. We therefore 
concentrate on a manifestation that has become deeply rooted in Western European 
value systems: how individuals transform urban public spaces into sites where identity 
can be affirmed in 'traditional' reaction to coercive governance. In other words, these 
public spaces – parks, boulevards, squares, shopping areas, stores, bistros, bars – are 
sites of struggle between individual and political identity, between the official past and 
the subjective present. These places are sites where individual memories are projected 
and  politicised  to  create  intersubjective  'histories'  that  legitimate  local  resistance  to 
official readings of the past while defining a degree of complicity with the technologies 
of  governance.  In  other  words,  in  order  to  legitimate  a  vision  of  the  future,  people 
politicise  very  local  space  in  a  way  that  intersects  and  sometimes  opposes  official 
readings of the past. 
                                                             
11 This has happened sporadically here and there, but a more detailed analysis would require that we 
examine who is voting and not voting, not to mention an analysis of particular ways in which elections are 
sometimes manipulated in favour of the status quo. For example, one could argue that certain recently 
enabled family legislation in Germany limiting child support is a sign of malaise with traditional views of the 
family as people, especially men, wish to start anew and cut ties with the past. Here is not the place to 
present this analysis, however.   Lanoue, Mirza, Pantaleon / The collapse of the European … 
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Over  the  last  ten  years,  more  or  less,  there  has  emerged  a  growing  popular 
resentment to the EU and its meddlesome (and costly) policies
12, coupled to a rejection 
of older ethno-nationalist sentiments that the EU had vowed to eradicate by creating a 
'European' culture. This resentment is admittedly hard to document, in part because the 
recent data are still subject to debate. In addition, there is certainly a popular tendency to 
demonise the EU and blame it for problems that have  no direct connection  with its 
policies, such as increases in the cost of living, increased difficulties in finding jobs, and, 
more recently, a sense of generalised malaise and fear of the future that is difficult to 
document but nonetheless mentioned by many informants. Whatever the facts, and 
apart from the financial dimensions of its policies, the EU is viewed as intruding more and 
more in local affairs, which leads to resentment.
13 This must be qualified by the tendency 
of middle class citizens to exploit EU institutions to create new opportunities for social  
advancement. We are not proposing, therefore, that the EU has polarised the political 
landscape, but its presence at the very least has complicated lifestyle choices that were 
once linked to a clearer (albeit more limited) structure of opportunities for i ndividual 
social and economic advancement.  
In particular, there have been recent changes to the signification of urban public 
spaces in the development of new identities as members of the middle class try to cope 
with increasing financial and cultural pre ssures, especially those associated with EU 
attempts  to  forge  a  new  pan -European  identity  and  with  new  lifestyle  choices 
(cosmopolitanism) that are fast becoming the norm in parts of Europe. Here, we will only 
mention one such policy, the European Capitals of Culture (ECoC) programme that was 
launched by the EU (then, 'European Community') in 1983 (as "Cities of Culture" till 
                                                             
12 In the words of an EU report (2005a:3), " … significant sections of the European public are not convinced 
that Europe is on the right track … Although the picture varies considerably between Member States, 
feelings of indifference to the European idea are widespread … The reasons for this reduced confidence 
are complex and include sluggish economic growth, heightened feelings of economic and personal 
insecurity, fears of loss of identity and a more general feeling of ‘disconnect’ between what happens in 
‘Brussels’ and in people’s everyday lives." This unease is not new; see Shore and Black (1994), who trace 
the complexities of EU identity. 
13 Again, we are addressing very general tendencies that are admittedly hard to document. The dynamics 
we describe should be framed against the traditional policies adopted by national governments, and 
especially the standard measures adopted by researchers who try to document the ‘standing’ or 
development of a particular country vis-à-vis others. For example, see some Romanian statistics at 
http://culturadata.ro/PDF-uri/4.%20Studiul%20statistici%20comparative.pdf (May 2011), which tries to 
establish Romania’s position by appealing to fairly standardised measures of culture : theatre, film, and 
opera production and attendence; number of libraries, books and readers; number of museums and 
exhibits. The question is not about a particular country’s statistics and whether or not these can be 
improved, as it is a sign of how governments and their institutions insist on defining integration. In other 
words, our argument is that people still feel pressured despite the number of standardised cultural 
productions put in place by national governments; indeed, it may be, as we suggest that it is precisely 
these standardised cultural policies (subsidising national cinema; opening museums and subsidising 
exhibits) that may alienate people, whose sense of crisis is only underlined by national governments 
reproducing their standard technologies.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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1999). Since that time, nearly 40 cities have held the title
14. Surprisingly, little research 
has been done on the impact of ECoC status, despite the fact that the EU has no formal 
monitoring system in place (Garcia 2004b:321) and so reports by participating cities are 
voluntary and naturally stress only the positive aspects of the ECoC experience. 
Although the accent of the ECoC program me is on cultural events as a way of 
glorifying the past to revitalise the present (usually, through the tacit assumption that 
'high' and 'formal' cultural events in a globalised context will attract large numbers of 
upscale tourists and entrepreneurial sp onsors whose money will revitalise the local 
economy; cf. Evans 2003), there are usually unforeseen consequences and politically 
unwelcome conclusions, not the least of which is that the idea of cultural revitalisation as 
a panacea to revive moribund citie s has an intrinsically destabilising on local identities 
since  its  aim  is  more  to  create  a  standardised  and  sanitised  image  for  foreign 
consumption than to cater to local needs (cf. Gibson and Stevenson 2004).  
These may include (but not always) engagement s and changes at the planning 
stage
15: typically, 1) expropriating some residents from targeted buildings and rerouting 
traffic flows (ECoC programmes usually involve building large "infrastructural hallmarks" 
such as opera houses and museums; see Garcia 20 04b); 2) forming financial cartels (for 
example, ₤43 million in infrastructural investments in Glasgow in 1990; Garcia 2004b:319, 
though most was not from the EU) that combine EU, national and local funds (municipal 
and private), which can reinforce the power of already-existing elites but also create 
vicious infighting as players jockey for position in the newly-defined financial and political 
networks; 3) mobilising the political capital for dislocations that municipal governments 
know could be unpopular with some residents; this typically involves large-scale publicity 
campaigns that address civic pride rather than specific benefits, especially since most 
benefits  seem  to  accrue  to  elites  rather  than  to  displaced  and  disempowered  social 
categories.  
ECoC cities may also have to deal with the aftermath: 1) rents and real estate prices 
in  the  historic  centre  can  increase  dramatically,  since  renovations,  restorations  and 
embellishments usually lead to gentrification that pushes some people from the centre 
to the suburbs, leading to a loss of prestige and status as they can no longer afford to live 
in the upscale centre; 2) people who move into the re-gentrified centre (though not all 
ECoC events are staged there) are likely to be newly rich, validating new status claims as 
they add the cachet of the historic centre to their social capital; 3) gentrification of shops 
and  restaurants  (a  process  that  is  also  linked  to  cosmopolitanism)  can  also  change 
perceptions of civic space, since a) upscale shops are less likely to offer local wares aimed 
at satisfying quotidian demand (for example, there are often fewer or no food shops left 
after  such  gentrification;  typically,  these  are  replaced  by  high  end  restaurants  and 
                                                             
14 More than one city can be named in a given year. See  
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/becoming_c_e_en.html (2-10-2007). The 
programme was launched in 1983, but the first city was named in 1985. 
15 See, for example Garcia (2004a), which examines Glasgow's 1990 ECoC experience, and Garcia (2004b), 
which examines general problems of cultural revitalisation as a political and economic strategy. 
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clothing stores), and b) embellishments are popularly identified with hegemonic political 
processes imposed by central planning that ignore local meanings of public spaces (for 
example, the ECoC programme bestows legitimacy on developers, who were generally 
seen  as  surreptitiously  influencing  municipal  governments  to  favour  their 
'developments');  4)  selective  renovation  establishes  a  temporal  baseline  –  the  high 
points of the city's history (especially since ECoC status is usually sought by cities to 
combat urban decay in the present) that validate claims to its 'capital of culture' status – 
that becomes normalised as the point of reference for establishing individual credentials 
in  local  status  wars.  Questions  of  genealogical  purity  and  depth  can  increase  in 
importance and in their semiotic complexity, especially since it is very often only people 
with  new  money  –  often,  image  and  information  entrepreneurs  –  who  can  take 
advantage of the historically-restored neighbourhoods and their more upscale shops and 
restaurants.  
In 2007, one of us (Lanoue) spent nearly two months in Sibiu, a 12
th century city of 
300,000  in  north-central  Romania  that  was  celebrating  its  status  as  a  ECoC.  The 
celebrations were lavish – public concerts, fireworks, and film and theatre festivals – and 
tied to Romania's newly-acquired EU membership. It was not Lanoue's first visit
16, and in 
recent years he had witnessed the preparations involved – mostly renovations of highly-
significant 'historic' buildings on the city's main squares (especially those that played a 
role in local history, such as the seat of its medieval guilds), changes to the street plan to 
redirect traffic flow, embellishment of parks and fixtures such as 'period' street lamps. 
The  overall  effect  was  a  de  facto  rezoning  of  the  historic  centre.  There  were  many 
consequences:  1)  many  residents  could  no  longer  afford  the  increased  rents  after 
gentrification, 2) many had been outright evicted by 'rezoning'
17, 3) non-residents who 
nonetheless had their shops in the centre could no longer afford the increased rents, or 
their clientele disappeared once ground level workshops were c onverted to upscale 
bistros and shops, 4) even if some were exempt from these first three processes, many 
could no longer fit into the new social landscape and developed a sense of social malaise 
as traditional networks collapsed or were simply eclipsed by  the new. Note that these 
effects were not only felt by the poor, since some older shopkeepers and residents had 
been well-off. For example, the local intellectual bourgeoisie, who for decades had 
attached their special status to the fact of living in the  heart of the historic town, were 
often victims of their own malaise  faced with a new centre even if they could afford to 
reside there. 
A new mix of people started to frequent the embellished city centre; 1) newly rich 
'entrepreneurs'
18;  2)  people  from  hinte rland  villages,  some  in  search  of  simple 
                                                             
16 Eight months since 2002. 
17 That is, individual residential buildings were rezoned for commercial use. 
18 Most of the new revenue is apparently tied to deals involving 'Europeanisation': some former State 
companies have been privatised by an ingenious scam (my information comes from a senior Romanian 
manager): in the 1990s, people used political connections to be appointed directors of State firms, would 
run them into the ground by deliberate mismanagement and buy them at reduced prices from the 
government eager to get rid of its (by now) inefficient and obsolete physical plant to appear in conformity Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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excitement (to view the concerts and other activities, to shop in the newer 'European' 
and 'American' branded stores or to vicariously share the city's new 'cosmopolitan' and 
'European' branding), 3) others come to  exploit the increased numbers of legitimate 
tourists (mostly Germans). In brief, many categories became enriched, financially and 
politically: 1) building firms (at least one is allegedly owned by a highly placed architect 
placed in charge of historic renovations); 2) property owners with connections to City 
Hall who could negotiate good prices on their strategically-located buildings or whose 
buildings could claim 'historic' status and receive funds for restoration; 3) people with 
capital  and  foreign  connections  able  to  launch  chic  foreign  lines  of  clothes  and 
accessories in their high-end shops. Others became impoverished and forced to move 
into cheaper lodgings outside the core. Worse, the selective investments that enriched 
City Hall cronies also had multiplier effects on identity struggles, driving not only a new 
economy  that  soon  became  unaffordable  to  'decent'  salaried  people  (teachers, 
engineers and technicians, small shopkeepers)
19, but impacting on how these people saw 
themselves: once exemplars of successful jumps into middle class status but now doubly 
exiled to the suburbs and to the older pattern of struggling to get ahead by taking on 
two or three 'demeaning' jobs.
20  
The cosmopolitan city 
Not all cities are ECoC, and not all members of the middle class have been affected by 
this  programme.  Nonetheless,  the  changes  associated  with  it  are  emblematic  of  EU 
penetration  into  daily  life  and  of  the  pressures  that  increasingly  impact  on  urban 
residents. One reaction is to bolster individual capital by cultivating cosmopolitan identity 
markers.  
Cosmopolitanism  is  an  elusive  quality.  Rapport,  for  instance,  refers  (2007)  to  a 
dimension  that  goes  above  and  beyond  local  cultural  adaptations.  He  argues  that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
to EU pollution and safety standards. These new capitalists had private agreements with foreign firms. 
Once privatised, they would 'buy' (with shares in the new company) the foreign partner's older 
technology, increasing productivity and efficiency (by Romanian standards). These Romanians thus 
established their 'entrepreneurial' (and 'elite') status, while foreigners managed to sell outdated 
equipment, acquired shares in the new Romanian company, and remained globally competitive (many 
Romanian products were rebadged with foreign names for export) because of massive savings on labour 
costs (Romanian salaries are one quarter or less of the Western European salary scale). 
19 Approximately 20 new banks have appeared since 2005, too many for legitimate needs (in the same 
period, only one new factory was built, dedicated to producing car parts for export; it employed several 
hundred workers).  
20 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer who called attention to a report on the ECoC programme 
that was prepared by the Ministry of Culture (CCCDC : Centrului de Studii si Cercetari in Domeniul Culturii, 
Centre for the Study and Research in the Domain of Culture).  It reviews the effects, and not surprisingly 
concludes favorably, that the ECoC was appreciated. The questions asked by the review, however, are 
biased only to the events and to Sibiu’s profile as a tourist site. Clearly, the organisers, who represent a 
consortium of professionals and business interests, asked only questions touching their interests. It is not 
surprising that there is not one mention of people being displaced and of other socio-demographic 
changes. See http://culturadata.ro/Cercetari%20finalizate.html (May 9 2011).    Lanoue, Mirza, Pantaleon / The collapse of the European … 
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cosmopolitanism is not a mere antidote to the hegemony of a particular cultural identity 
(Rapport credits Hannerz 1990 for establishing this position) but something deeper and 
transcendental that provides a key to understanding what is human. As Rapport states 
(Ibid.:226), "[anthropological cosmopolitanism] recognises individuals as possessing an 
'existential power' to construe their lives as their own projects," to which we would ask, 
when did humans lose this ability that it must be regained by politicising a particular 
research agenda, which in any case completely evacuates the anthropological subject? 
Admittedly,  cosmopolitanism  as  a  concept  can  describe  almost  any  multidimensional 
identity
21, but in the context of Europe, where governments have long manipulated, 
transformed  and  politicised  various  cultural  elements  to  create  a  clear  (and  hence 
ideologically one-dimensional) national identity, cosmopolitanism is an individual reaction 
to the hegemonic subtext of two such processes, national and European.  
As Hannerz notes (1996), cosmopolitanism implies the capacity to choose identities 
and especially to emancipate (partially, we would say) oneself from the embodied 
complicity inherent in modern national cultures (cf. Buruma and Margalit 2004), though 
we would not limit this to instances when people acquire sp ecialised and marketable 
knowledge  and  skills  ("professionalization";  Isin  2002).  Defining  cosmopolitanism  in 
allegedly objective terms, especially those derived from the market economy, belies its 
subjectively meaningful quality. Its sources may indeed be   in transnational flows, as 
Appadurai argues (1996:49), but its transnational implications are irrelevant to people 
whose identification with local places is the primary means of establishing their political 
and cultural resistance to hegemonic processes of state-sponsored cultural manipulation. 
Appadurai,  like  many  scholars  of  'deterritorialisation'  and  of  'mobile  sovereignties', 
carefully selects his examples from the margins of the world system, where people have 
fewer life choices and therefore have more limited responses to transnational flows. In 
the core EU region, however, members of the threatened middle-class add 'international' 
patterns  of  consumption  to  their  personae  without  renouncing  'traditional'  status 
hierarchies, hence augmenting their moral capital and bolstering their status in an effort 
to  define  a  third  option  against  older  nationalisms  and  newer  pan -Europeanism. 
Cosmopolitanism is no longer an elite phenomenon (cf. Friedman 1995), nor is it an 
inevitable reaction or a completely free c hoice. It is merely an enrichment of individual 
social (and moral) choices that is easily attainable to members of the middle class.  Its 
appeal lies in apparently circumventing well-established patterns of complicity with and 
resistance to national hegemonies. 
Admittedly, this tendency is hard to document because these trends are evolving 
and are polysemic. More income is spent on housing (including fuel and power) than on 
consumables such as food, clothes and toiletries, so we are examining changes to a 
relatively small proportion of total household expenditure. Nonetheless, nearly one-third 
of Europeans have changed their eating habits in the last three years (Kyprianou and 
Almunia 2006:79) to favour a more expensive 'Mediterranean' diet, despite the fact  that 
                                                             
21 Rapport mentions (2007:223) other uses of cosmopolitanism in a review article/debate. The list is too 
long to cite here. We refer readers to the original. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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food  prices  rose  slightly  more  than  the  consumer  price  index  (Ibid.:86).  "Increased 
leisure, in the form of more foreign holidays and a larger number of trips to restaurants 
has  resulted  in  higher  consumer  awareness  as  regards  foreign  foods  and  drinks" 
(ibid.:74). But from the same paragraph we find, "… the increasing share of Europe's 
population in active employment and the growing number of large supermarkets has 
generally led to a reduction in the average number of shopping trips that are made for 
food each week" (ibid.:74). In other words, the higher number of active workers and 
moribund productivity means that more workers are working less than before and so 
each  has  more  leisure  time,  which  is  spent  on  more  international  holidays,  which, 
according to this EU report, allegedly fuels the demand for 'international' foods (this is 
circular  reasoning,  obviously).  There  is  also  a  phenomenal  increase in  the  number  of 
stores and restaurants with Italian names (except for Italy, of course, where American 
names reign), even when the stores and restaurants do not offer Italian products. Why 
these small but significant changes? 
These  choices,  however  freely  made,  are  not  without  a  price.  The  costs  of  the 
Community's  Europeanization  policies  have  made  it  difficult  for  the  middle  class  to 
continue its usual strategy of climbing the social ladder by aping elite manners. Estimates 
of these costs vary from ₤32 (the EU claim) to ₤873 (claimed by a British think tank)
22. 
This latter figure includes direct taxes and hidden costs to meet EU standardisation 
(house wiring, business systems, etc.). For example, many formerly 'grey market' smaller 
services are billed explicitly by people afraid of more vigilant governments now obliged 
to meet EU standards of fiscal responsibility. Moreover, EU agricultural policies of quotas 
offset by subsidies may have increased food costs by 25% to 80% compared to world 
market prices
23. 
Normally, refined behaviour that signalled a jump in status had to be validated by 
material signs of superior rank – a country house, old furniture, elegant clothes, a tonier 
address, and vacations in the mountains. These are increasingly beyond the reach of the 
middle class. In fact, it is the older class dynamics described a generation ago by Bourdieu 
(1984) that are disappearing as cosmopolitanism and the EU create a patchwork of new 
identity  signs.  There  is,  however,  a  complication:  choosing  the  more  costly 
'cosmopolitan'  option  –  Bobo  ('bourgeois  bohemian')  diets,  exotic  vacations,  and 
imported designer clothes and music – limits investments in traditional markers that the 
middle class has not completely abandoned – good schools, a 'proper' address, etc. This 
dilemma weakens people's emotional investment in national political cultures seen as no 
longer  able  to  guarantee  traditional  status  structures  and  practices,  pushing  people 
further  along  the  cosmopolitan  spiral.  It  is  the  European  version  of  American  Bobo 
slumming with homeboy fashions described by Brooks (2000). 
This dynamic is complicated by the standardised definitions of social space that 
accompanies  Europeanization  policies.  Europeanization  claims  to  celebrate  national 
                                                             
22 http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/ (4-09-06). 
23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Agricultural_Policy#Artificially_high_food_prices (04-09-06).   Lanoue, Mirza, Pantaleon / The collapse of the European … 
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cultures
24, but only those sectors that are attached to very explicit ideological discourses 
–  'historic'  period  architecture,  museum  (or  'national')  art
25, 'efficient' and 'rational' 
urban planning. Under the guise of celebrating local history by allegedly restoring public 
spaces,  the  EU  is  est ablishing  a  hyper -historically  correct  19
th  century  architectural 
baseline as a point of aesthetic reference that distances people from the immediacy of 
'their' urban places. Moreover, the ideological subtext of 'high' culture (cf. Gellner 1983) 
targeted by the EU ignores traditional cultural dynamics ('cultural intimacy', in Herzfeld's 
felicitous  formulation,  1997)  that  once  blended  'official'  and  'low'  culture  (eating, 
dressing and even sexual performance) to produce 'national' stereotypes, often complex 
and  contradictory  but  nonetheless  efficient  in  defining  a  nebulous  space  where  the 
ritualised  combat  of  complicity  and  resistance  between  'oppressive'  State  and  'free' 
citizen took place. People are finding it difficult to claim 'their' traditional public spaces 
increasingly dominated by cosmopolitan signs yet semiotically denatured by EU policies 
of  hyper-historic  realistic  restoration  that  establish  a  mythified  belle-époque  as  an 
aesthetic baseline far removed from the present.  
Our argument is that this vicious circle has transformed intimate identity into a new 
battlefield that undermines people's 'traditional' reaffirmation of the intimate Self vis-à-
vis State management. This pushes people to break with 'national' culture and 'local' 
tradition to reinvent themselves and the public spaces they inhabit. The consequences 
for individual status and identity can be catastrophic as local spaces become redefined in 
terms of distant places (an individual strategy: cosmopolitanism that creates a demand 
for  high  end  shops  offering  'exotic'  and  imported  items)  and  a  distant  time  (a 
government strategy: visual hyper-correctness that validate ancien regime aesthetics). 
This process is inseparable from changes to more 'private' aspects of the Self: dress, food 
(usually associated with private space but also attached to the local in terms of shopping 
and by its 'traditional' regional signification) and entertainment. In brief, assaults to the 
traditional culture of place, which until recently normalised the antagonistic forces of 
State  'tradition'  and  citizen  'resistance',  are  today  threatened  as  new  definitions  of 
intimacy  and  individuality  emerge  in  response  to  growing  EU  intrusion.  The  result  is 
perhaps immeasurable but nonetheless significant pressure on the urban middle classes, 
expressed  as  growing  frustration  and  cynicism,  which  may  be  a  prelude  to  its 
disappearance  as  a  significant  player  in  traditional  power  arrangements  within  long-
established politico-cultural frameworks.  
                                                             
24 For example: "Diversity is one of the defining features of the enlarged European Union. With the 
prospect of further enlargement ahead, differences such as those in living conditions, quality of life and 
cultural traditions are likely to be more pertinent than ever. While the nurturing of cultural diversity lies at 
the heart of the European ideal, fostering greater cohesion is also a central priority" (European Community 
2005b:3). 
25 Of course, large museums display international art; curators and critics are often united by the reification 
of art as an allegedly classless and stateless category. However, museum funders are undoubtedly aware of 
the prestige of being able to brag about being able to house highly-coveted acquisitions from abroad. The 
Mona Lisa in the Louvre is a quintessential French painting. Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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